The Agra Summit Indo-Pak Relations Beyond Kashmir

The summit showcased the different perspectives of India and Pakistan. India aimed to address all aspects of relations, including CBMs, political and economic issues, and nuclear risk reduction, in line with the Lahore Declaration, as well as Kashmir. Pakistan, meanwhile, prioritized Kashmir as the core issue, considering other topics secondary. Despite not achieving a final breakthrough, India made preliminary progress on issues such as terrorism, Siachen, and Kashmir. Both sides agreed that resolving the Kashmir issue could normalize relations and committed to holding annual summits and biannual foreign minister meetings, covering Peace, Security, and Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs), as well as Jammu & Kashmir, and Terrorism and Narcotics.

The long-standing differences between India and Pakistan cannot be resolved in a single meeting. The resolution of issues has often been inconsistent, with events involving non-state actors deepening mistrust and sometimes halting progress altogether. Each time talks stall, it feels like the process must start over. Still, the Vajpayee-Musharraf Summit represents a new beginning, and it is important not to give up. This summit is a notable step in the relationship between the two countries.

Do we consider the Agra Summit a failure or a success? It is essential to remember that in the realm of politics, particularly in international politics, there's no such thing as either success or failure. International relations are constantly fluid. Summit, at a minimum, revealed the frozen divergences between the two countries. It provided a framework that could lead to solid and stable relationships. There were challenges on both sides that were addressed.

At first, it was too early to dismiss it as an unfinished event, as not closing the summit by releasing a statement is not an indicator of the effectiveness of a summit. A declaration at the end of a summit is not a definition of success, going by the fate of declarations/proclamations in 1999 in Lahore (Vajpayee-Nawaz Sharif), 1997 in Male (I. K. Gujral-Nawaz Sharif), 1989 in Islamabad (Benazir Bhutto-Rajiv Gandhi), 1987 in New Delhi (Rajiv Gandhi-Zia-Ul-Haq), and 1972 in Simla (Indira Gandhi-Z. A. Bhutto).

If we view Agra as a fresh start for talks, especially after the Kargil conflict and the 1999 Lahore Declaration, its value lies in both leaders being willing to engage, even without a formal agreement. Not having a statement may actually demonstrate a genuine effort to tackle tough issues, rather than making promises that might not be kept. Although the summit did not reach a conclusion, it paved the way for further discussions.

Both countries stated that Agra would lead to further steps toward peace and cooperation. Even criticism from Hurriyat does not mean it was a failure. The hope created by the summit can guide future efforts and help avoid outside interference. If talks move to the foreign ministers, as planned, it could make room for important compromises that were not possible before.

Musharraf's meetings with the press in Agra drew considerable attention, but holding media conferences and issuing statements about Pakistan's views on India, as well as meeting with Hurriyat Conference members, may have hindered the negotiations. To make real progress, it is better to avoid such distractions. Many factors contributed to the summit's inconclusive result, although not all of them can be confirmed as the primary reasons.

The summit did not produce an agreement on the most difficult issues between India and Pakistan, mainly because the draft was unclear. Both sides took a firm stance on the language used. For India, cross-border terrorism was the main concern, while Pakistan focused on Kashmir. India viewed Kashmir as a crucial component of its territory and rejected any language that implied a resolution to the issue. Pakistan did not like references to sponsored narcotics and terrorism and preferred the term "cross-LoC" instead of "cross-border." After long discussions, India agreed to remove the mention of cross-border terrorism but was satisfied that it was still listed as one of the main issues.

Pakistan also dropped its demand for language about meeting the hopes of the people of Jammu and Kashmir as a solution to the Kashmir issue. These changes demonstrate how both sides adjusted the draft to meet their needs but perhaps overlooked addressing the core problem. When the draft was nearly ready, the prime minister sent it to the cabinet for approval, but cabinet members reportedly opposed it. Pakistan suggested that outside influence, possibly from the Home Minister, Mr. L.K. Advani, played a part.

India now faces a confident military leader in Musharraf, while Pakistan continues to struggle with issues like political freedom, economic growth, and religious conflict. Indian officials have considered whether Musharraf can control militant groups in Pakistan. His claim that violence in Jammu and Kashmir is just a local, historical issue shows he may not fully recognize the current reality or public opinion. Many hoped Musharraf would use his military background to help stabilize relations, but he did not stand out from previous military leaders.

The Kargil conflict suggested he did not fully understand the impact of military actions, and Agra reinforced doubts about his willingness to make strategic changes. Still, both countries have agreed to keep talking, which gives hope for better relations. However, violence in Jammu and Kashmir has increased, and Pakistan has stopped trying to control the Line of Control, leading to renewed clashes with Indian troops.

The Americans employed various strategies to compel India and Pakistan to engage in negotiations. Abdul Satar was told that the US acknowledged Pakistan's role in the detection of terrorist acts against US interests overseas but did not do anything about stopping the threat of extremism emanating from Afghanistan. It warned him that new Arab elements were advancing into Afghanistan. Richard Boucher, US State Department spokesperson, said that the concerns regarding India and Pakistan, as well as the problems they will have to tackle, are significant to both the US and India.

Vice Secretary of State Richard Armitage believed that there was a lot of groundwork to be completed to garner the political consensus to lift US sanctions against Pakistanis. However, the upcoming India-Pakistan Summit later in the month could impact the process. We look forward to their cooperation in establishing a foundation for peace and stable conditions in the region. We are hopeful that they can do their part in the US.

Armitage continued to criticize Musharraf for undermining the rule of law, first by overthrowing a civilian administration before declaring himself president. Armitage was recently in India to promote President Bush's campaign for missile defense and characterized the fifty-year-old U.S. relations as largely flawed. He extolled India as a democratic country and a growing regional power. It is interesting to note that Armitage was not in Pakistan.

The US administration persuaded India to agree to a negotiating table with Pakistan. India was told that a conflict similar to Kashmir would distract its attention from becoming a global power. India was offered lollipops to help enhance and expand anti-terrorism training. US officials said Osama bin Laden, as well as the Taliban, was a common threat to the national security of India and the US. American officials have uncovered pro-U.S. and anti-Chinese tensions in the Pakistani Army. Pro-Chinese elements within the army, including Lt. Gen. Aziz and Lt. Gen. Mehmood, were exerting pressure on Musharraf, a moderate.

The lobby, they claimed, had strong ties to Jehadi groups. General Musharraf was described as a peacenik dressed in commando attire. US officials claimed that it was the fear of a counter-coup that forced Colin Powell to nudge New Delhi to accept Musharraf. The US claimed that a successful summit would enhance Musharraf's power within the country. Success requires acceptance from India. India was also requested to provide financial assistance to Pakistan.

The peace lobby of the United States in India has launched a media campaign to seek unilateral concessions from Pakistan. India has already offered 3 billion IMF concessions to Pakistan in the past year, in addition to concessions regarding Kashmir, such as the extension of NICO, as well as the involvement of Hurriyat.

The same arguments were offered following the assumption of Benazir Bhutto as the heir of power. The argument was that India required her to interact gently to avoid provoking the Pakistani military to overthrow her. However, the reality is that India had made an accord with its military.

While the Agra summit did not result in a joint declaration or statement, it marked a meaningful milestone in India-Pakistan relations by clarifying each side's core concerns and reaffirming the need for continued dialogue. Despite five intensive rounds of talks that could not resolve the immediate stalemate, both Musharraf and Vajpayee gained a more nuanced appreciation for each other's positions and the political constraints they faced.

This experience can facilitate future negotiations and strengthen the basis for trust and potential compromise. Ultimately, the summit reinforced the importance of sustained engagement and signaled a shared, if cautious, commitment to work toward peace and stability in the region, offering hope that future efforts may yield more tangible progress.