The Agra Summit Indo-Pak Relations Beyond Kashmir

The Summit highlighted the different views and perspectives of the two nations. India was planning to talk about the entire spectrum of relations from CBMs to political and economic issues, including nuclear risk reduction and other areas identified by both nations as part of the Lahore Declaration in addition to Kashmir. But, Pakistan maintained that Kashmir was the most critical issue to the Indothe Indo-Pak dispute. That was only when discussions regarding other issues, such as economic cooperation or CBMs, were worthwhile. Pakistan had already shown interest in Kashmir as the principal subject of discussion before the talks started. In the first place, it is essential to discuss what was achieved and what were the principal aspects of the agreement Agra held. These issues included terrorists, Siachin issues, Kashmir dispute. A few steps were made, even though the anticipated end still needed to be realized. Both parties agreed that a settlement of the Kashmir issue would pave the way for the normalization of relationships with India and Pakistan. The sides also agreed that they would have each year a summit and biannual meetings of foreign ministers to discuss three issues: Peace, Security and Confidence Building Measures (CBM), Jammu & Kashmir, and Terrorism and Narcotics.

The decades-old differences between the two nations can't be resolved in a single trip. Additionally, one should keep in mind that the process of putting ineffective efforts continued inconsistently. Because of the many changes and ups, or even events triggered by non-state actors, trust deficits were caused. These events that shook trust pushed any ongoing process into a deadlock. When we are done with any procedure, we believe that we must begin again. The Vajpayee-Musharraf Summit is a starting point, and we shouldn't quit. It's undoubtedly a significant event in bilateral relationships.

Do we consider Agra Summit a failure or a success? It is important to remember that in the realm of politics, and when it comes to international politics, there's no such thing as either success or failure. International relations are constantly fluid. Summit, at a minimum, revealed the frozen divergences between the two countries. It offered a structure that could result in solid and stable relations. There were challenges on both sides that were able to be addressed. At first, it was too early to dismiss it as an unfinished event, as not closing the Summit by releasing a statement is not an indicator of the effectiveness of a Summit. Declaration at the end of a Summit is not a definition of success going by the fate of declarations/proclamations in 1999 in Lahore (Vajpayee- Nawaz Sharif), 1997 in Male (IK Gujral - Nawaz Sharif), 1989 in Islamabad (Benazir Bhutto - Rajiv Gandhi), 1987 in New Delhi (Rajiv Gandhi-Zia-UlHaq), 1972 in Simla (Indira Gandhi- Z A Bhutto).

If we consider Agra as an attempt to restart bilateral discussions, and we see the Agra summit as an attempt to relaunch discussions between the two countries, especially following the Kargil war (recall that the Kargil war occurred following that 1999 Lahore declaration), What is not by itself and a positive sign? The simple possibility that both heads decided not to issue an official statement when there are still issues to be solved shows that they are serious about business, instead of merely stating to everyone that we have agreed on a few things but that they were they are not going to be implemented, like the previously mentioned Summits. If one wishes to remain positive and objective and not give in to the Press statements, we could only conclude it was clear that the Agra Summit was not conclusive. It is imperative to continue discussions through more focused effort and, most importantly, by changing our mental outlook. With all the allegations against one another, It is encouraging to see that both countries stated that Agra Summit will be a prelude to the next steps and that future efforts would focus on restoring peace to the region, establishing trust and friendship and working together in cooperation. Even the self-proclaimed saviour for Kashmiris Hurriyat, Hurriyat claimed it was a defeat, and there was any evidence that the Agra summit was a loss. We should not be discouraged and tear up the book's opening, claiming that it didn't meet all readers' expectations. The optimism generated through the Agra Summit will propel us in the right direction. We hope that the Agra summit aimed to strengthen relations between the two nations, especially following the Kargil war. In addition, it would prevent the US from interfering with this Kashmir issue. Suppose the Agra summit succeeds in lifting bilateral talks to the official level (foreign ministers' levels) as it has been projected. In that case, it could prove to be an essential result at this meeting. This will allow enough space for compromise, which could not be achieved in negotiations at the level of delegations.

During his time in Agra, Musharraf's breakfast with press members allowed the media to generate sensational buzz among the people. He should have avoided certain things such as negotiation-hazardous media conferences, giving statements about the feelings of Pakistani people toward the Indian government, and hosting tea parties for members of the Hurriyat Conference. If we're only determined to move forward, we should avoid getting caught up in these things that are not serious. There are other reasons for this non-conclusive Summit. They have yet to be proven as the reasons for successful talks.

A deal on the most challenging and contentious issues that dropped the relationship between our nations was not reached at the Summit entirely due to the ambiguity in the agreement's draft. A hardcore approach was taken to the terms used within the document. For India, the issue of terrorism across borders is the primary concern. Pakistan is obsessed with Kashmir. India believes Kashmir to be an essential component of it. The Indian party reportedly objected to the wording in the draft document interpreted as a settlement of the Kashmir issue (the reader might notice the mention of Kashmir in the context of an issue and not as a dispute). The Pakistani delegation was unhappy with the mention of sponsored narcotics and terrorists. Pakistan also resisted the phrase "cross-border" and kept referring to it as only cross-LoC. After a marathon discussion lasting two days, four times at the official level, India decided to drop the mention of cross-border terrorism. They were pleased with including the term terrorism in part of three major issues.

Additionally, Pakistan gave up on the term in line with the hopes for the population of J&K as a solution to the Kashmir issue. The above facts can be a guideline as to what extent we are fooling ourselves by not focusing on the root of the matter after the phrases were modified according to the needs of both sides and when the draft agreement came to a conclusion close to being adopted and accepted the Prime Minister reported that he had sent it to the cabinet for approval. At this point, the cabinet members reportedly opposed it. Pakistan claims that an invisibility hand played a role and indirectly referred to the Home Minister, MrL.K.Advani.

The Indian side is now confronted with a confident, perhaps too confident-minded military mind facing Pakistan's challenging problems with political freedom, economic growth, and religious conflict. They have evaluated Musharraf's capability and willingness to control the militants of the fundamentalist movement operating within Pakistan. His assertion that violence involving armed forces is a common occurrence in Jammu, as well as Kashmir, is local and rooted in the past has demonstrated his disdain for the reality of the situation and public opinion. It was anticipated that President Musharraf would use his military experience and careful thought to move the India-Pakistan relationship towards a more stable level. The common concerns of both countries and the entire region are believed to drive his trip to India. Regrettably, he failed to present himself as no better than his predecessors in the military. Kargil said that General Musharraf did not understand the significance of a military operation. Agra strengthens the view that President Musharraf could not grasp the opportunity for strategic change to put Pakistan on a different course. The two countries have maintained that they would keep up their dialogue. That is why there is hope for the future of the India and Pakistan relationship. The violence within Jammu as well as Kashmir has risen. Pakistan has given up on maintaining control of the Line of Control. It has started firing again at where Indian troops have reacted.

Americans employed various strategies to force India and Pakistan towards a negotiating table. Abdul Satar was told that the US acknowledged Pakistan's role in the detection of terrorist acts against US interests overseas but did not do anything about stopping the threat of extremism emanating from Afghanistan. It warned him that there were new Arab elements were advancing to Afghanistan. Richard Boucher, US State Department spokesperson, said that the concerns regarding India and Pakistan and the problems they will have to tackle are significant to them and the US.

Vice Secretary of State Richard Armitage believed that there is a lot of groundwork to be completed to garner the political consensus to lift US sanctions against Pakistanis. However, the upcoming India-Pakistan Summit later in the month could impact the process. We're looking forward to their cooperation to establish a foundation of cooperation that will result in peace and stable conditions in the region. We are hopeful that they can do this—the US.

Armitage continued to attack Musharraf for sabotaging the rule of law, first by overthrowing a civilian administration before declaring himself the President. Armitage was recently in India to promote President Bush's campaign for missile defence and characterized the fifty-year-old USA relations with Pakistan to its disgrace as largely false. He extolled India as a democratic country and a growing regional power. It is interesting to note that Armitage was not in Pakistan.

The US administration persuaded India to agree to a negotiating table with Pakistan. India was told that a conflict similar to Kashmir distracts the attention of becoming a global power. India was offered lollipops to help in enhancing and expanding anti-terrorism training. US officials said Osama bin Laden as well as the Taliban, was a common threat to the national security of India and the US. American officials have uncovered pro-US and anti-Chinese tensions in the Pak Army. They informed Indian officials that Musharraf, an American moderate, was being pressured by pro-Chinese elements within the army, including Lt Gen Aziz and Lt Gen Mehmood. They claimed that the lobby had strong ties to Jehadi groups. General Musharraf was described as a peacenik dressed in commando attire. US officials claimed that it was fear of a counter-coup which forced Colin Powell to nudge New Delhi to accept Musharraf. The US claimed that a successful summit would increase the power of Musharraf within the country. Success requires acceptance from India. India was also requested to provide financial assistance to Pakistan. The peace lobby of the United States in India has launched a media campaign for seeking concessions unilaterally to Pakistan. India has already offered 3 billion IMF concessions to Pakistan in the past year, in addition to concessions regarding Kashmir, such as the extension of NICO as well as the involvement of Hurriyat.

The same arguments were offered following the assumption of Benazir Bhutto as the heir of the power. The argument was that India required her to interact gently to avoid provoking the Pak military to overthrow her. However, the reality is that India had made accord with her military.

The Agra summit ended because the two sides could not reach a Joint declaration or statement. Five rounds of discussions among the top two officials did not make a dent in the cold. But, the Summit reaffirmed the divergent approaches to address issues that impact their relationship. Positively, Musharraf and Vajpayee could have understood each other's points of view. The two would better perceive each other's capabilities and be willing to make necessary concessions if a solution to the Kashmir problem is to be identified. They would have understood the political pressures of each other. General. Musharraf, whose experience of dealing with India was limited only to operations in the military, has witnessed close-up his experience with the Indian political leadership and its attitude towards India and the India - Pakistan relationship. He may have enjoyed the Indian public reaction to his visit an enjoyable experience.